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Abstract 
Demographic trends, with the relevant ageing of the population, are mostly 
determining the direction of social policy (in terms of healthcare, social 
services, pensions, future proposals to cover dependence, etc.). This is 
unfortunate, as the social policy agenda should be much more focused on 
poverty than on age, equal opportunity policies, fighting unemployment, 
combating social exclusion and guaranteeing the basic rights of all citizens. If 
current trends do not change, the elderly will become the main beneficiaries of 
an increasing proportion of social expenditure over GDP. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic crisis in which we are still currently enmeshed, which effects will 
probably remain long enough to change the way we understand the State 
involvement in our lifes, spurs us to embark upon these reflections to make 
several proposals for action that should inform new forms of social policy. Until 
today, social policy has focused more on the intra-generational aspects of 
welfare (variations between rich/poor, educated/illiterate, professionally 
trained/less trained, the healthy/the ill and between citizens with debts or 
savings!) that on the inter-generational aspects of the young and elderly cohorts.  
This has taken for granted that what social policy had to do for the elderly it was 
compensated for what technology did for the human capital, productivity and 
improved salaries of the younger population. This balance is being broken today 
given the evolution in the job market (young people are suffering from more 
unemployment, their training is stagnating and low-salary jobs go with 
precarious jobs) and demographics. The reflection below aims to provide a brief 
overview of the effects of demographic ageing, bearing in mind the behaviour of 
the job market and its effects on different aspects of our lives. We should note in 
advance that the rise in life expectancy is a valuable social fact in itself, and that 
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the goal is that by reorienting public social policy, to restore an acceptable 
balance for overall welfare of our generations. 
 
2. Effects of the new state of affairs: The ageing of the population 
The ageing of the population affects the intergenerational balance of welfare 
through the following elements of economic policy: 
— The impact on income/assets bearing in mind the effect of the 
investment first, and then the liquidation of assets throughout the life 
cycle. 
— The balance between consumption and savings. 
— Some components of consumption: entertainment, housing, transport, 
personal services, etc. 
— Finally, the mix of public/private consumption. 
Ageing affects the following elements of social policy: pensions, 
healthcare, benefits for long term care and other social services. This 
intergenerational effect is due to their impact on the ordinary budgets, and its 
fiscal response: either higher taxes, the substitution effect they exert on other 
public policies if the goal is to keep a balanced budget, on the public debt if it is 
financed in this way. In any event, this would lead the elderly incomes to 
depend mostly on public benefits at the expense of the young contributors. 
The proportion of the population older than 60, as a proportion of the 
total population of Spain, will double by 2040 according to some forecasts. 
Without changes in public policies, this is, maintaining the current policies, this 
will mean that the proportion of public spending on benefits for the elderly will 
rise from 12.6% to 33.1% of the GDP. In terms of total public spending, this 
would crowd-out other (current or future) public policies targeting the share of 
those groups from their current 68% to only 28% of the GDP. If total public 
spending increased in such a way to prevent this substitution effect, the fiscal 
pressure would have to rise from its current 38.2% to 57.2% by 2040: this is, a 
fifty per cent. If these benefits are financed through deficit and debt, by 2029 we 
would enter into what is called the “snowball effect” (150% of the GDP). Finally, 
from another vantage point, 68% of the net incomes our elderly would depend 
on social spending. What is more, the tax-free incomes of the passive classes 
would even exceed the incomes of actively employed persons (because of the 
burden of taxes and payments on the latter).  This makes for a clearly 
unsustainable situation. 
Finally, we should note that at the current pace, the complement from 
private pensions would only yield a compensating effect of three points of GDP 
(one-third, for example, of its share in the United Kingdom or Canada). 
Likewise, the “cushion” brought about by our elderly’s cohabitation with their 
adult children would continue to be essential: 40% compared to 6% in some 
Nordic countries, and in this sense the new benefits for dependence would have 
to level the playing field in the decision on whether or not to institutionalise 
dependents, at present family and basically females dependency. However 
policies should be kept neutral towards informal and formal care and on 
institutionalisation in/outside home.  
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All of this new situation necessitates the following counterbalances: 1) 
keeping a global perspective on social spending and finance resulting from the 
demographic change: who receives what and who finances who. For this, a more 
horizontal and less “compartmentalised” vision is required of the impact of 
ageing on public policies by focusing them on their recipients: not who does 
what, but for what purpose is done; 2) maintaining a fair distribution rule in 
response to the evolution in the demographic vector (the elderly) and the job 
market (young cohorts) in an integrated fashion. Otherwise, there is a danger of 
a substitution effect of the benefits of one group in favour of others; 3) acting via 
selective policies. The elderly are not on average the poor of the country today. 
They may be the poor in terms of income, but not in terms of assets. Their real 
purchasing power is often higher that for the rest of the population, they face 
less vital expenditures and their public benefits help to improve at least partly 
their welfare. However, there is significant variation among them. There are 
major pools of poverty among the elderly.  In this sense public policy should be 
less universal and more selective, more closely tied to proof of need and means. 
In short, demographic trends, with the relevant ageing of the population, 
are determining the direction of social policy (in terms of healthcare, social 
services, pensions, future proposals to cover dependence, etc.). This is 
unfortunate, as the social policy agenda should be much more focused on 
poverty, equal opportunities, active employment, combating social exclusion 
and guaranteeing the basic rights of all citizens, not unambiguously linked to 
age.  
If the current trends do not change, the primary beneficiaries of an 
increasingly large share of social spending within the GDP will be unavoidably 
the elderly (an electorally important group with more concentrated political 
dimensions). The evolution in pensions and the derived internal rate of return 
(IRR) for current pensioners, the dynamic of non-contributory pensions, 
healthcare without equity discrimination in the allocation of resources (fair 
innings), the evolution in some asset values, and the dynamic of new job 
contracts dissociated from productivity will be the main causes. 
The described situation contrasts with the need for new workfare policies 
and to reorient fiscal pressure, today still highly concentrated on certain groups 
of contributors, in order to guarantee social reinsertion, housing, active human 
capital training policies, efficient salaries, job market security, etc. All of these 
kinds of policies have at present low relative importance and may even have less 
in the future. 
On the other hand, we should consider the need to coordinate public and 
private pensions by offsetting fiscal spending regressiveness of private funds, as 
well as considering the relative price differential in view of the different 
shopping baskets for pension indexation. We must also assess the importance of 
delayed retirement, which affects both contributions and pensions, and consider 
the delay in the entry into the job market and a shorter contribution course, 
more likely in among those with less training and lower qualifications. Their 
shorter life expectancy compared to the greater longevity among the wealthy 
today may create an additional intragenerational unbalance. 
Ensuring future retirement today primarily depends therefore on the 
quality, quantity and distribution of the productive assets – physical, human 
and environmental – that the new generations have or inherit. More policies 
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centred on ‘ex ante’ child investments would guarantee a better future welfare 
than ‘ex post’ inherited wealth transmissions. 
Otherwise, under the present situation, we face postponing 
emancipation, extended education and training or unemployment for a longer 
time, and delaying stable coupledom. All this leads to a drop in the birth rate, 
with fewer overall opportunities to save for the late stages in life. 
We can also see a foreseeable better future (in terms of pensions) for 
couples in which both work and have more training in a context that favours 
greater “endogamy” of monogamy among couples with similar educational 
levels. Otherwise, higher income and more education imply fewer children and 
thus a further concentration of wealth. 
Despite all this, families’ financial precariousness is worrisome, not so 
much because of the financial burden of their debt as because of the distribution 
of assets by income deciles and how this economic cycle has affected them 
(Family Financial accounts, Bank of Spain 2015). 
We should ammend the unequal opportunities we observe the sooner the 
better: in childhood, within the family, with a new equilibrium between work – 
for both women and men – and family assistance, in order to prevent couples 
from being “penalised” for having children (levelling out the incentives for home 
care); the uncertainty of poverty (number of children); broken families (single-
parent families) and dynastic accumulation. The importance of training human 
capital from the early years (cognitive skills, discipline, health and motivation to 
learn, all of which are closely tied to the family and cultural milieu) has been 
proven, as has its influence on job opportunities (likelihood of unemployment), 
income (salaries) and wealth and its accumulation. 
Therefore, attention must be paid to investment inequalities in many 
areas associated with poverty (single-parent families, immigrants, etc.) and to 
the challenge of making the measures compatible with s major influx of women 
into the job market. We should likely focus on “first-year” mothers with low-
skilled jobs, avoid concentrations in schools linked to poor housing or by other 
forms of segregation.  We need to grasp that what is fair is different than simple 
egalitarianism and apply it from a generational perspective (throughout an 
individual’s lifetime, bearing income dynamics in mind). 
Intergenerational accounting provides for this purpose the bridge 
between today’s public debate on social deficits and the necessary future 
financial surplus (under intertemporal budgetary constraints). It identifies the 
present and future net per-capita transfer for each generation (in current 
values), given the demographic prospects and taxpaying and the age public 
spending profiles. That is, it calculates how much a newborn today will have to 
contribute to public spending (or private spending, accepting a rise in taxes) if 
they end up with a zero balance throughout their lifetime.  
 
3. Ways to rebalance inter-generational welfare 
Musgrave’s Rule. Based on the active-passive ratio (workers/pensioners), a 
referent must be established.  This is the case of the so called Musgrave rule. It 
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requires a predetermined coefficient of relative positions1 among age groups 
such that the variation in contributions (payments) vs. benefits (pensions) keeps 
the per capita (net) income coefficient of the active population constant with 
respect to the per capita (net) benefits of pensioners. Once the ratio has been 
determined, the taxes should periodically be adjusted to reflect demographic 
changes (downward) and productivity changes (upward). Therefore, if the 
population ages, the taxes rise but pensions drop in such a way that everyone 
“loses” in the same proportion. Therefore, the past income distribution is 
initially conserved. 
Regarding structural reforms for fiscal consolidation purposes, which can 
be analysed as substitutions rather than complements, the sovereign debt, has 
to be considered a sort of postponed tax. Non-structural reforms are today’s 
incomes redistribution within the same generation. The introduction of an entry 
barrier is in this sense equivalent to wealth that is transferred from future 
generations towards current generations. The opposite holds true, too:  these 
restrictive regulations must be removed. The scope of laws for employment 
protection and rent control today extract income from future generations in 
favour of current ones. Fiscal consolidation is worse for this purpose than 
structural reforms, since even though both restore the generational balances, 
the former raises taxes and thus generates an excess burden that enlarges both 
the current and future consequences. Even though the measures are 
substitutive, they are not alternative, we have to be able to analyse the optimal 
composition combining these at any rate both two fronts. 
Another way to tackle the unbalanced effects is through the accumulation 
effects, first, and the liquidation of the assets of the baby boomers, later. In fact, 
the literature claims that movements in the price/earnings ratio of shares 
closely follow the coefficient between the middle-aged population and the 
elderly. When pensioners complement their pensions by selling assets, they put 
pressure on the price of assets for everyone and hinder young people from 
accessing wealth. 
Likewise, in view of the internal rates of return or the expected net 
transfers for each incoming cohort, the proportion of debt, both in the sense of 
the Kotlikoff effect2- and the effort to pay it off-, and its magnitude -given the 
impact that public debt has on economic growth-, other things equal (the 90% 
of the GDP Reinhart/Rogoff rule), with an average drop in the growth rate is 
estimated at slightly higher than 1% of GDP.3 Finally, with contexts of almost 
zero interest rates such as today, the claim that higher inflation is needed leads 
to an additional uneven damage, that will depend on the groups’ relative degree 
of indebtedness and financial protection because either the indexing of pensions 
or the credit conditions. 
 
                                                 
1 A good description can be found in G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J.Myles 
(2002), Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
2 A good description of its application in Spain can be found in C. Patxot and R. Farré (2007), 
Evaluación de la sostenibilidad del estado del bienestar en España, Barcelona, Universitat Abat 
Oliva, Fundació pel Desenvolupament Humà i Social. 
3 C. M. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff (2008), “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight 
Centuries of Financial Crises”, NBER Working Paper, no. 13882 (March). 
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In brief, for all the former purposes, a ‘new-new’ welfare policy needs to 
be designed. Family structure and workfare strategies are central pieces if we 
wish to rebalance the equity effects that at present deteriorate the 
intergenerational equilibrium of welfare for our younger generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
